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PROPERTY LAW-THE RECREATIONAL NAVIGATION DOCTRINE -THE
USE OF THE RECREATIONAL NAVIGATION DOCTRINE TO INCREASE PUBLIC
ACCESS TO WATERWAYS AND ITS EFFECT ON RIPARIAN OWNERS
I. INTRODUCTION
An elderly man, his middle-aged son, and his young grandson launch
their boat into a river at a public boat ramp. They motor their boat down
river and carefully navigate through the tight timber. The old man's eyes fill
with memories from long ago. There are trees here close to 1000 years old,
and their bases are wider than a car is long. Through the pre-dawn darkness,
all three see a smattering of posted signs and purple paint on the trees.
Knowing they are still below the ordinary high-water mark, they press on.
As hunting opens, the party begins shooting at ducks coming into the
flooded timber to loaf. Everyone is enjoying the many wonders of an Ar-
kansas waterway. Suddenly, two men appear from a neighboring farm. The
men tell the hunters that this is private, not public land. They tell the hunters
that because the streambed does not meet the criteria to be a navigable wa-
terway, they own the rights to the stream to the center of the stream thread.
The men say that if the hunters do not leave, they will call the police and
have them arrested for criminal trespass. Additionally, the two men tell the
hunters they will sue them for encroaching upon their privately held hunting
rights to the timber.
This scenario is neither fiction nor a rare happening. Indeed, among
people who enjoy the natural wonders of waterways in Arkansas and other
states, there is much debate as to what constitutes a navigable waterway,'
whether there are any remedies for those who wish to navigate a recreation-
al waterway, and what recourses are available for riparian land owners who
want to protect their interest in the land and the waterway.2
A state's approach to the recreational navigation doctrine answers
many of these questions. The current trend in Arkansas and many other
states is to use this doctrine to open a greater number of streams and water-
ways once considered private for use by the public to the ordinary high-
water mark and to limit remedies for riparian landowners. First, this note
will discuss the federal definition of navigability.4 Second, the note will
explore various approaches to the navigation doctrine in jurisdictions for-
eign to Arkansas. Next, this note will provide an in-depth historical look at
1. See Arkansas Flyway Forum, http://www.refugeforums.com/refige/showthread.
php?t=626689&highlight-Village+Creek.
2. Id.
3. See Anderson-Tully Co. v. McDaniel, 571 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2009); Nichols v.
Culotches Bay Navigation Rights Comm., L.L.C., 2009 Ark. App. 365, 309 S.W.3d 218.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part H.B.
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Arkansas's treatment of this doctrine.6 Then, the note will analyze the relev-
ance of recreational navigability for waterways that have not yet been de-
clared navigable.7 Finally, this note will discuss theoretical issues concern-
ing recreational navigation doctrines as they relate to possible remedies for
riparian landowners.
II.BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Standard of Navigability
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the term
navigability has multiple meanings in different contexts.9 The federal gov-
ernment, through the Commerce Clause and admiralty jurisdiction, has re-
served an interest in all navigable waterways for the purposes of regulating
trade between the states and creating a uniform body of laws governing
maritime commerce.'o Thus, when the United States, as a sovereign, gave
title in lands and waterways to the states, the states took title to all except
those which were preempted by the federal government." These reserved
areas of property include navigable waterways.12
Under the federal standard of navigability, a navigable waterway is
held in the public trust to the ordinary high-water mark.'3 Federal authorities
do not define waterways by the tidal test, in which waters affected by the
ebb and the flow of the tide are navigable.14 Instead, the test of navigability
is whether the waterbody may be used as a highway for commerce." If a
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
9. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1979). The term has been
used for purposes including setting the boundaries of the navigational servitude, "defin[ing]
the scope of Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, . . . determin[ing]
the extent of the authority of the Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Appropri-
ation Act of 1899, and . .. establish[ing] the limits of the jurisdiction of federal courts con-
ferred by ... the United States Constitution over admiralty and maritime cases." Id.
10. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700,
704 (1987); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1824); see also J.W. Looney & Steven G.
Zraick, Of Cows, Canoes, and Commerce: How the Concept of Navigability Provides an
Answer if You Know Which Question to Ask, 25 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 175, 176
(2002) (noting the varied approaches to determining navigability).
11. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1845).
12. Id. at 216.
13. See Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. at 704.
14. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (citing In re The Genesee Chief, 53
U.S. 443 (1851)). (The tidal test prevailing in England is not applicable to the waters of the
United States.).
15. 33 C.F.R. § 329.6 (2009).
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waterway is navigable in the federal sense, it is open for use by the public to
the ordinary high-water mark.16
Congress has delegated commercial regulation of navigable waterways
to the United States Army Corps of Engineers.17 The Corps of Engineers
has created administrative policies concerning the navigability of waterways
based on common law and court decisions.' 8 The Corps of Engineers looks
to several factors to determine if a waterway is navigable.19 The determina-
tive factor is the waterbody's capability of use by the public for commerce.
The focus is on the susceptibility to commercial use rather than present or
past commercial use.20 Moreover, a waterway need not cross a state line to
be a navigable waterway. 21 Instead, it needs only to have the potential to
carry interstate commercial items.22 However, even this federal standard
does not include land covered by water during a flood.23
The rights to waterways within states that were not preempted by the
federal government were transferred to the several states.24 When the states
entered the Union, they took title to all property within their respective
boundaries that was not reserved to the federal government. 25 Accordingly,
the lands taken by a state included waterways deemed non-navigable by the
federal government. Because states are their own sovereigns, they can exert
their own control over these waterways.2 6 This means that states can either
16. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 36 (1894) (citing St. Clair Co. v. Lovingston, 90
U.S. 46 (1874)).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2009).
18. 33 C.F.R. § 329.3 (2009).
19. Id. § 329.5 (2009). These factors include past, present, or potential presence of
interstate or foreign commerce, physical capabilities for use by commerce, and defined geo-
graphic limits of the waterbody.
20. This is an even more relaxed standard that the one used to assert navigability in
cases of admiralty. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1979).
21. 33 C.F.R. § 329.7 (2009). This is especially the case when the waterway connects to
other waterways through which commerce may flow.
22. Id.
23. Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606, 632 (1923); Parmv. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135, 143
(5th Cir. 2007).
24. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 215-16, 223 (1845) ("[T]he United States have no
constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain,
within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted"
by the Constitution.).
25. Id. This is called the "Equal Footing" doctrine. Id. at 222. New states entering the
Union "have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original
states." Id. at 230.
26. Id. at 222. A "fundamental principle underlying the state court decisions is that
navigability reflects the public nature of the water." Duncan Hollomon, The Struggle for
Alaska's Submerged Land, 5 ALASKA L. REv. 69, 105 (1988) (citing Welder v. State, 196
S.W. 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)). "That public nature, as a legal concept, in turn implies
sovereign authority to control use by the public, the existence of public usufructuary rights,
and the existence of a duty upon the state to protect those rights." Id.
2011] 163
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expand or hold fast to the federal definition of navigability as it relates to
those waterways.27
B. Various States' Assertions of the Navigability Doctrine
Only a handful of states have declined to expand the definition of na-
vigability to include the recreational use of a waterway. For example, the
state of Louisiana has structured its navigability doctrine over state water-
ways in conformity with the federal standard. On August 12, 1910, the state
claimed all waterways not owned by private individuals. 28 All determina-
tions of navigability are based on the ability of a waterway to support inter-
state commerce. 29 This standard is one that closely adheres to the federal
standard. Additionally, Louisiana has expressly rejected a standard of navi-
gability based on recreational use.3 0
Louisiana is joined in its approach by Kansas. In Kansas, the state su-
preme court has interpreted legislation so as to preclude a public trust doc-
trine for waterways used for recreational purposes.31 The Kansas Supreme
Court has also refused to create such a doctrine for streams that do not meet
the federal definition of navigation.3 2 The court has strongly implied that
making any such change from the bench would be nothing more than judi-
cial legislation. As such, that court has expressly refused to recognize a
recreational doctrine of navigability.34 Instead the court has stated that "[]f
the nonnavigable [sic] waters of [Kansas] are to be appropriated for recrea-
tional use, the legislative process is the proper method to achieve this
goal."
27. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 215-16, 223 (holding that it is for the states to establish for
themselves such rules of property as they may deem expedient with respect to the navigable
waters within their borders and the riparian lands adjacent thereto).
28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008).
29. State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 163 So. 145, 150 (La. 1935) (citing In re
The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874)).
30. Johnson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 303 So. 2d 779, 784-85 (La. Ct. App. 1974)
(citations omitted) (noting the absence of commercial activity and the presence of recreation-
al activity insufficient to sustain a finding of navigability); Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Dela-
croix Corp., 285 So. 2d 845, 852 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting the proposition that a body of
water deep enough to float a pirogue is navigable under Louisiana law); St. Mary Parish
Land Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 167 So. 2d 509, 514 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (noting that merely
because small craft could navigate some areas of water included in the waterway does not
prove navigability).







However, most states have expanded the definition of navigability to
include waterways that are used solely for recreational purposes. Mississip-
pi is one such state.36 That state has recognized that the standard of "naviga-
ble in fact" extends to more than just the use of a waterway for commercial
purposes and that navigability extends to vessels beyond large commercial
types.3 7 Instead, the presence of recreational activities such as fishing, log-
ging, and recreational pleasure boating, is sufficient to sustain a finding that
a waterbody has a navigable character.38
But, in Mississippi, the fact that a waterbody may be used for a recrea-
tional activity alone is insufficient to confer a standing of navigability.39 If it
were, then every landowner's private, landlocked pond would be open to
trespass by every member of the public with a fishing pole. Instead, a wa-
terbody will be declared navigable for recreational purposes only when a
member of the public can reach the waterbody without trespass.40 Such
access grants to that person the right to use the waterway subject only to a
like use by others and reasonable regulation by the state.41 MiSSissippi's
recreational navigation doctrine is nearly identical to Arkansas's doctrine.4 2
Tennessee also recognizes the recreational navigation doctrine. 43 That
state's doctrine holds that a river is navigable if "the river, in the ordinary
state of the water, is capable of and suited to the usual purposes of naviga-
tion."" While the ability to support commerce is still the main consideration
in the determination of a waterway's navigability, 45 Tennessee's construc-
tion of what constitutes a commercial purpose is more liberal than the fed-
eral standard of interstate commerce.46 In fact, Tennessee holds that duck
hunting and guiding duck hunters using gasoline powered boats has a com-
mercial value, even though this type of activity is not the typical trade that
36. See generally Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1150, 1152 (Miss. 1990).
37. Id. at 1150 (citing Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 146 So. 291 (Miss. 1933)).
38. Id. at 1152.
39. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 500-01 (Miss. 1990).
40. Id. The Dycus court considered an "oxbow" lake, or a lake formed when a river, in
that case the Mississippi River, changes course cutting off a portion of the old channel and
leaving a natural lake. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1613 (Philip
Babcock Gove et al., eds., 2002). However, the principle remains true for other types of
waterbodies. The crux of a finding of recreation under this doctrine is whether the waterbody
"communicates" with another waterway through which access can be obtained. Communica-
tion occurs if, for example, the oxbow lake connects to navigable river in any way. Dycus,
557 So. 2d at 501.
41. Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 501.
42. See generally State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 234, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663 (1980).
43. See generally State v. W. Tenn. Land Co., 158 S.W. 746, 748-50 (1913).
44. Id. at 750.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 749-50.
2011] 165
UALR LAW REVIEW
occurs by use of an ocean-faring vessel.4 7 Additionally, stumps and trees in
the waterway do not indicate that a waterway is not navigable.48
A number of western states have also expanded the definition of navi-
gability of waterways to include recreational use. The Oregon Supreme
Court has recognized that boating or sailing for pleasure, as well as boating
for mere pecuniary profit should be considered navigation.4 9 The court
stated that "[m]any, if not most, of the meandered lakes [in Oregon] are not
adapted to, and probably will never be used to any great extent for commer-
cial navigation."5 0 On the other hand, the court noted, Oregon's waterbodies
are used for multiple other purposes, including sailing, rowing, fishing,
fowling, bathing, cutting ice, ice skating, domestic water usage, and irriga-
tion.51 The court held that a "boat used for the transportation of pleasure
seeking passengers is, in a legal sense, as much engaged in commerce as is
a vessel transporting a shipment of lumber."5 2
The Idaho Supreme Court, in recognizing a recreational navigation
doctrine, also observed that such a doctrine is the modern trend.13 That court
has held that any stream that, "in its natural state, will float logs or any other
commercial or floatable commodity, or is capable of being navigated by oar
or motor propelled small craft, for pleasure or commercial purposes, is na-
vigable."54 In so holding, the court affirmed the trial court's reasoning that,
in accordance with modem authorities, the basic question of navigability is
the suitability of a particular waterbody for public use."
California has recognized that its streams are a vital recreational re-
source of the state. 56 Like Idaho, California not only recognizes a recrea-
tional doctrine of navigability, but also that such a doctrine is the modern
trend among the states.5 7 The California recreational doctrine provides that
"members of the public have the right to navigate and to exercise the inci-
47. Id. The court found Reelfoot Lake in Tennessee navigable because it is a prime
location for commerce, mostly of which is recreational duck hunting and fishing. Id. at 750.
48. Id. at 749-50. Reelfoot Lake, Tennessee, and other waterbodies were formed during
the New Madrid earthquakes that occurred in 1811 through 1812. STEVE BOWMAN & STEVE
WRIGHT, ARKANSAS DUCK HUNTER'S ALMANAC 57 (1998). During one quake, massive de-
pressions were formed, including Reelfoot Lake, causing the Mississippi River to run retro-
grade as it backfilled into these two lakes. Id. Numerous trees and stumps were present in the
waterbodies as the depressions forming the lake occurred over forested swamps. See id.
49. Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936).
53. S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1297-98
(1974).
54. Id. at 1297.
55. Id. at 1298.




dents of navigation in a lawful manner at any point below the ordinary high-
water mark on waters capable of being navigated by oar or motor-propelled
small craft."58
C. Arkansas's Recreational Doctrine of Navigability
In Arkansas, the riparian owner upon a navigable stream, deriving title
from the United States, takes only to the ordinary high-water mark.59 How-
ever, a riparian owner upon a non-navigable stream is entitled to the center
of it, ratably with the other riparian proprietors, with the extent of the inter-
est depending upon the frontage of the stream.60 "Although navigability to
fix ownership of a river bed or riparian rights is determined as of the date of
the state's entry into the union, navigability for other purposes may arise
later."6' The term "navigable" is particularly relevant because, in Arkansas,
if a waterway is navigable, members of the public have the right to use the
waterway at any point below the ordinary high-water mark.62 In fact, "de-
termining the navigability of a stream is essentially a matter of deciding if it
is public or private property."63 If a body of water is navigable, it is consi-
dered to be held by the state in trust for public use.
Arkansas first adhered to the federal navigation standard in determin-
ing which streams were navigable.65 In Barboro v. Boyle, a 1915 case, the
state supreme court held that the key to a finding of navigability was "the
usefulness of the stream to the population of its banks, as a means of carry-
ing off the products of their fields and forests, or bringing to them articles of
merchandise." This merely restated the federal definition of navigation.67
58. Id.
59. Barboro v. Boyle, 119 Ark. 377, 380, 178 S.W. 378, 379 (1915) (citing St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & S. R.R. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890)). Arkansas has
adopted the federal definition of the ordinary high-water mark. See State v. Parker, 132 Ark.
316, 320, 200 S.W. 1014, 1015 (1917) (citing Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931) ("The
high-water mark of a navigable stream, the line delimiting its bed from its banks, is to be
found by ascertaining where the presence and action of water are so usual and long continued
in ordinary years as to mark upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of the
banks in respect to vegetation and the nature of the soil.").
60. Barboro, 119 Ark. at 380, 178 S.W. at 379 (citing Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W.
931).
61. Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 83 Ark. App. 276, 287,
126 S.W.3d 738, 744 (2003) (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 282, 126 S.W.3d at 741.
63. Id. at 285, 126 S.W.3d at 743 (citing State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d
659 (1980)).
64. Ramsey, 53 Ark. at 322, 13 S.W. at 933.
65. See Barboro, 119 Ark. at 380, 178 S.W. at 379.
66. Id., 178 S.W. at 379 (citing Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931).
67. See id., 178 S.W. at 380.
2011] 167
UALR LAW REVIEW
However, in Barboro, the court also noted that there was room for the state
standard to progress.6 Specifically, the court stated that "[i]t is the policy of
this state to encourage the use of its water courses for any useful or benefi-
cial purpose." 6 9
The court noted that commercial purposes may include the use of wa-
terways for flooding rice fields and irrigating crops; the use of the water-
ways by the public for "domestic purposes" is also considered a commercial
purpose.70 Additionally, the court observed that "waters ... might be used
to a much greater extent for boating for pleasure, for bathing, fishing, and
hunting, than they are now used."7
Fifteen years later, Arkansas moved away from its adherence to the
federal definition of navigability. 72 Instead, the court began to consider oth-
er factors about waterways in making a determination of navigability and
focused less on whether the stream had previously been declared naviga-
ble.7 3 The court stated that meander lines are prima facie evidence of navi-
gability.7 4 Additionally, the court held that to accept a finding of non-
navigability based on an absence of a federal declaration when meander
lines are present is erroneous. 7 5 More recently, the Arkansas Court of Ap-
peals reaffirmed the state's departure from the federal standard of navigabil-
ity, recognizing that the determination of navigability of state waterways
involves an analysis that is in flux rather than some static standard of federal
determinations occurring when Arkansas joined the union.76
In 1973, the court moved even closer to a full-fledged recreational doc-
trine by reiterating that commercial viability was not the determining factor
68. Id., 178 S.W. at 380.
69. Id., 178 S.W. at 380.
70. Id. at 382-83, 178 S.W. at 380. The court specifically named "pleasure resorts" as
one possible domestic use. Id.
71. Barboro, 119 Ark. at 382-83, 178 S.W. at 380 (citing Lamprey v. State, 53 N.W.
1139 (1893)).
72. Lutesville Sand & Gravel Co. v. McLaughlin, 181 Ark. 574, 583, 26 S.W.2d 892,
894 (1930).
73. See id, 26 S.W.2d at 895.
74. Id., 26 S.W.2d at 895; see also Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1906).
75. Lutesville, 181 Ark. at 583, 26 S.W.2d at 895. The use of meander lines as prima
facie evidence of navigability has been a staple in navigability determinations through 2003.
See Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 83 Ark. App. 276, 286, 126
S.W.3d 738, 744 (2003) (finding Echubby Lake to be a non-navigable waterbody). But see
State v. Mcllroy, 268 Ark. 227, 233, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663 (1980) (finding the Mulberry
River to be a navigable waterway).
76. Ark. River Rights Comm., 83 Ark. App. at 287, 126 S.W.3d at 744 (noting that the
Supreme Court of Arkansas did not address navigability for the purpose of public usage in




to navigability. 77 In 1980, Arkansas joined the modem trend and endorsed a
recreational doctrine of navigability.78 In State v. Mc~lroy, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that it need not be bound by the federal conception of
navigability.79 The court stated that the test of navigation is one that should
not be applied too literally.80 In fact, according to the court, a stream need
not be navigable at all of its points or for the entire year to support a state
finding of navigability.8 ' The court then announced that a waterway is na-
vigable if it can be used for recreational purposes, even if it is not in use
year-round. 82 The court stated that a finding of navigability through
recreation confers all the rights incident to a finding of navigability for
83
commercial purposes.
The court's holding in Mc~lroy is compelling for a variety of reasons.
First, the court traced language back to Barboro to reach the McIlroy hold-
ing, making the language in Barboro nearly prophetic. In Barboro, although
the court adhered to the federal standard in defining navigability and its
dependence upon a commercial criterion,84 the court added that "[i]t is the
policy of this state to encourage the use of its water courses for any useful
or beneficial purpose. There may be other public uses than the carrying on
of commerce of pecuniary value."85 In doing so, the Barboro court alluded
to the fact that a river may be navigable for purposes other than the benefits
of commerce. This inference was relied upon by the Mc~lroy court in its
finding of a recreational doctrine of navigability. 17
Another reason the Mclroy holding is compelling is that the court in-
dicated that it had found an opportunity it had been waiting for for over half
77. See Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680, 682, 496 S.W.2d 372, 374 (1973) ("[Tlhe finan-
cial success of a navigable venture was not an exclusive test of navigability.").
78. See generally State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d 659 (1980).
79. Id. at 234, 595 S.W.2d at 663 (citing Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation &
Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137
(Wyo. 1961)) ("Navigation in fact is the standard modem test of navigability, and, as em-
broidered by the federal courts, controls when navigation must be defined for federal purpos-
es maritime jurisdiction, regulation under the Commerce Clause, and title disputes between
the state and federal governments.").
80. Id., 595 S.W.2d at 663 (citing Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S.
113 (1921); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931
(1890)).
81. Id., 595 S.W.2d at 663 (citing Econ. Light & Power Co., 256 U.S. 113).
82. Id., 595 S.W.2d at 665.
83. Id., 595 S.W.2d at 665. This means that a state finding of navigability for recrea-
tional purposes will entitle the public to use the waterway up to the ordinary high-water
mark.
84. Barboro v. Boyle, 119 Ark. 377, 382, 178 S.W. 378, 379.
85. Id., 178 S.W. at 380.
86. Id. at 382-83, 178 S.W. at 380.
87. See McIlroy, 268 Ark. at 235-36, 595 S.W.2d at 664 (citing Barboro, 119 Ark. at
382-83, 178 S.W. at 380).
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of a century, since Barboro. In McIlroy, the court noted that, since Barboro,
"no case presented to us has involved the public's right to use a stream
which has a recreational value, but lacks commercial adaptability in the
traditional sense."" The court called its definition of navigability in Barbo-
ro "a remnant of the steamboat era."89
The recreational doctrine lay relatively dormant until 2003, when the
Arkansas Court of Appeals cited McIlroy authoritatively.90 The court of
appeals also clarified the recreational doctrine. It held that state action inun-
dating one's private land to the extent that it becomes flooded for a period
of time may indicate that the land is now subject to the recreational doctrine
of navigability.9' Additionally, the court of appeals held that in order for a
waterbody to be navigable under the recreational doctrine, it would require
a "level of recreational use . . . compar[able] with the extensive use of the
Mulberry River in McIlroy."9 2 The court of appeals held that that "the occa-
sional foray by a fisherman" upon a waterway "does not render it naviga-
ble."
III. DISCUSSION
Recent court decisions in Arkansas indicate that the use of the recrea-
tional navigation doctrine is on the rise.94 In some cases, the doctrine is in-
voked in an attempt to have waterways, or features of waterways, declared
navigable through a declaratory judgment.9' In other cases, private citizens
are using the doctrine to assert public rights over waterbodies claimed to be
private by certain individuals.9 In most cases, the courts have found navi-
gability.97
88. Id. at 236, 595 S.W.2d at 664.
89. Id.
90. See generally Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 83 Ark.
App. 276, 286, 126 S.W.3d 738, 744 (2003).
91. Id, 126 S.W.3d at744.
92. Id. at 286-87, 126 S.W.3d at 744.
93. Id., 126 S.W.3d at 744. This particular phrase has the effect of altering the Mclroy
doctrine. Though it has often been cited in briefs, it has not been expressly adopted by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas. In fact, it is questionable whether the phrase is still favored by
the court of appeals.
94. See generally Anderson-Tully Co. v. McDaniel, 571 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2009); State
v. Hatchie Coon Hunting & Fishing Club, Inc., 372 Ark. 547,279 S.W.3d 56 (2008); Nichols
v. Culotches Bay Navigation Rights Comm., L.L.C., 2009 Ark. App. 365, 309 S.W.3d 218;
Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 83 Ark. App. 276, 126 S.W.3d
738 (2003).
95. Nichols, 2009 Ark. App. 365, at 1, 309 S.W.3d at 219 (seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that Culotches Bay, a portion of the Cache River, was navigable for recreational pur-
poses).
96. Anderson-Tully, 571 F.3d at 761 (attempting to intervene for purposes of invoking
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State declarations of navigability only occur on waterways specifically
declared non-navigable by the federal government. Such declarations reveal
two facts. First, a dominant public servitude on a state level exists notwith-
standing the similar federal servitude.98 Second, federal declarations of na-
vigability or non-navigability do not dispose of the issue of a navigational
servitude.99
Private citizens have asserted the recreational doctrine to gain rights of
access that inure from such a declaration.100 In Nichols v. Culotches Bay
Navigation Rights Committee, L.L. C., a motion for a declaratory judgment
was filed seeking to have the Culotches Bay, a portion of the Cache River,
declared navigable for recreational purposes.o The appellant moved for
summary judgment to have the Bay declared non-navigable.10 2 The trial
court denied the motion and instead raised and granted a sua sponte motion
declaring the Bay navigable. 0 3
the doctrine on behalf of an Arkansas citizen sued by a private club).
97. Compare Hatchie Coon Hunting & Fishing Club, 372 Ark. at 559, 279 S.W.3d at 64
(island submerged by navigable stream was in public trust) and Nichols, 2009 Ark. App. 365,
at 1, 309 S.W.3d at 220 (trial judge finds Culotches Bay navigable), with Ark. River Rights
Comm., 83 Ark. App. at 286, 126 S.W.3d at 744 (recreational use not extensive enough to
make Echubby Lake navigable).
98. It is worth noting that if such a doctrine exists at the state level, it must exist through
common-law principles.
99. Compare Nichols, 2009 Ark. App. 365, at 4, 309 S.W.3d at 222 (state appellate
court affirming refusal to declare the Cache River, Arkansas, non-navigable via summary
judgment), with 33 U.S.C. § 25 (2009) (federal declaration that the Cache River, Arkansas is
not navigable).
100. State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 237, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (1980) (A finding of
navigability through recreation confers all the rights that are incidental to such a finding); St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 322, 13 S.W. 931, 933 (1890)
(If a waterway is declared navigable, it is held in the public trust to the ordinary high-water
mark.).
101. 2009 Ark. App. 365, at 1, 309 S.W.3d at 219. Culotches Bay is a subsidiary of the
Cache River. The Cache River is a federally non-navigable waterway. See 33 U.S.C. § 25
(2009). The Cache River has been declared a "wetlands of international importance" and
non-navigable by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. BOWMAN & WRIGHT, supra
note 48, at 57. Such a finding precludes a federal preemption. In this case, the appellant
relied upon the Corps of Engineers declaration.
102. Nichols, 2009 Ark. App. 365, at 1, 309 S.W.3d at 219.
103. Id. at 4, 309 S.W.3d at 222. The case was reversed and remanded on appeal. The
reason for the reversal was procedural and not substantive, as the reviewing court held that
the trial court erred in improperly raising a sua sponte motion. Id. at 6, 309 S.W.3d at 219.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for summary
judgment to declare the area non-navigable effectively affirming that the area is not "non-
navigable." However, the issue of true navigability remains ripe for litigation. Nonetheless, if
the trial court's sua sponte motion is a litmus test for a future ruling, then it is likely the area
will be declared navigable.
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Another recent case, Anderson-Tully Co. v. McDaniel, represents the
joint interest of the state and the populace in asserting the recreational navi-
gation doctrine.'1 In that case, a duck hunter sought an opinion from the
Arkansas Attorney General's Office regarding the ability to hunt in a water-
bodyos posted as private in Desha County, Arkansas. 06 The Attorney Gen-
eral's office informed the hunter that, because the waterbody was accessible
via a chute from the Mississippi River, it was navigable under the McIlroy
recreational doctrine and that the hunter could use the waterbody to the or-
dinary high-water mark. 07 The club that purported to hold the hunting and
fishing rights to the lake brought an action in trespass in Desha County Cir-
cuit Court. 08 The Attorney General's office filed a motion to intervene,
asserting state ownership of posted land pursuant to the recreational naviga-
tion doctrine.' 0 9
The club voluntarily non-suited its case against the hunter before the
trial court had an opportunity to rule on the motion to intervene. 0 The club
then brought a federal suit, alleging a deprivation of its federal constitution-
al rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and sought a declaration that the Mc~lroy
doctrine violated the United States Constitution."' The suit also sought to
quiet title to the posted land1' 2 and to "enjoin the Attorney General from
attempting to take private property for public use by application of the recr-
eational [navigation doctrine].""' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the § 1983 claim against the Attorney General
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that the Attorney General had
104. 571 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2009).





110. Anderson-Tully, 571 F.3d at 761. A plaintiff has an absolute right to a voluntary
non-suit anytime before the case is submitted to a fact finder in the state of Arkansas pur-
suant to ARK. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). A voluntary non-suit in such cases is a dismissal without
prejudice. Au. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). The club's action in non-suiting its claim against the
duck hunter deprived the trial court ofjurisdiction, thereby preventing res judicata on the fact
that the state has an unseverable interest.
111. Anderson-Tully, 571 F.3d at 761.
112. Id. The § 1983 claim asserted an essential federal question, which was the basis for
federal court jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2009).
113. Anderson-Tully, 571 F.3d at 761. These claims came under federal pendant jurisdic-
tion. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The club was
undoubtedly trying to get into federal court for all the benefits thought to inure in a federal
forum. Had the federal court ruled favorably on the pendant claims, the club could re-file in
state court against the duck hunter and assert res judicata; title to the waterway would have
vested in the club and could not be navigable and, therefore, could not be public, leaving the
state with no interest in the waterbody through the McIlroy doctrine.
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sovereign immunity.114 With the federal court lacking jurisdiction, the club
was left to pursue its claims in state court." 5
One question of law that the Eighth Circuit broached, but did not ad-
dress in Anderson-Tully, was whether the use of the recreational doctrine
creates a condemnation under the Takings Clause of the United States Con-
stitution.116 In 1979, the Supreme Court indicated that imposing a naviga-
tional servitude does not provide a blanket exception to the Takings Clause
when Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority to promote naviga-
tion.'17 However, in 1987, the Court noted a distinction between a taking
under Congress's authority to regulate via the Commerce Clause and a wa-
terway that is navigable through a public domain navigational servitude."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also dis-
tinguished between the power to regulate waterways declared navigable
under the Commerce Clause via the Rivers and Harbors Act and waterways
made navigable through a public domain navigational servitude." 9 The
Ninth Circuit noted that the latter type of navigational servitude is "a domi-
nant servitude, a plenary authority, and a superior navigation easement ...
[which] generally relieves the government of the obligation to pay compen-
sation for acts interfering with the ownership of riparian, littoral, or sub-
merged lands." 20
This distinction is a subtle one that both reconciles and distinguishes
between the different types of navigational determinations and the effects of
those determinations. For example, if the government asserts control over a
privately held waterway via the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
then a taking may have occurred for which compensation may be availa-
ble.121 However, if the government declares a waterway to be navigable in
114. Anderson-Tully, 571 F.3d at 764.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 762 n.2 (noting that the club did not assert a takings claim).
117. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173 (1979). Takings only occur when
there is a deprivation of property which would destroy private rights. Regulation of water by
the government does not constitute a taking. See Peter N. Davis, Recreational Use of Water-
courses, 4 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 71, 78 (1964) (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Niaga-
ra Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
339 U.S. 799 (1950)). However, denial of land use, or the deprivation thereof, as part of a
scheme to regulate a navigable waterway might be considered a taking. See id.
118. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 704 (1987) (citations
omitted) (holding that "[tihe proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any private
property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not
result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always
been subject").
119. Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 1493-94 (citations omitted).
121. Whether or not a taking has occurred will likely depend on whether the abolished
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the sense of a public domain, no taking occurs and no compensation is
available. Instead, the riparian rights in the latter types of cases were merely
illusory and always held by the state.122
A declaration of navigability for recreational purposes will likely fall
under the public domain type of declaration, depending on the meta-
principles of the particular doctrine followed by a court. 23 An astute argu-
ment for a taking will take into consideration the nature of the navigation
declaration. If the purpose of the declaration is to regulate current or poten-
tial commerce, including the commercial nature of recreation, then a takings
argument may be viable.124 However, in a state that has recognized a domi-
nant navigational servitude under a public domain theory rather than a
commercial regulation theory, the declaration of navigability will likely be
the type of servitude described by the Ninth Circuit in Boone.
States considering expanding or recognizing a recreational navigation
doctrine would benefit from grounding their doctrine in a public domain
type of declaration. This is because they can avoid, or at least minimize,
litigation by avoiding takings claims related to federal and state constitu-
tional limitations on government condemnation. When declarations avoid
regulation appearances and fall under public domain assertions, it is likely
that any deprivation of property rights claimed by riparian landowners will
be a deprivation of a right they never truly possessed. This will make it dif-
ficult for riparian landowners to recover from a state declaration of naviga-
bility for recreational purposes as the riparian land owners never held the
rights to the waterway usage they claim to have lost by such declaration.
property bundle is an "important one." Daniel C. Kramer, When Does a Regulation Become
a Taking? The United States Supreme Court's Most Recent Pronouncements, 26 AM. Bus.
L.J. 729, 761 (1989) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
122. "Water users who allege a taking of their interests in water bear a heavy burden of
establishing compensable property rights." Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling
Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REv., 679, 733 (2008) (citing Brian E. Gray, The Property
Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 12-13 (2002)). "In most cases,
they will not be able to meet this burden because the law of nearly every state gives broad
regulatory powers to the government to restrict an appropriator's rights to use water where
necessary to protect endangered species, water quality, and other environmental interests."
Id. (citing Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 1, 26 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. The viability of a taking depends upon the meta-theory of the state navigation doc-
trine. There are multiple types of navigability. See supra note 9. If the state doctrine's meta-
theory is grounded in admiralty, then it is likely that no taking has occurred. See supra notes
118-21. However, if the state doctrines meta-theory is grounded upon commerce, then a
taking argument may succeed. See supra notes 118-21.
124. In states such as Tennessee and Mississippi, where the definition of commerce has
been expanded, the argument is ripe. It seems antithetical that a federal action may be a
"taking" where a similar state action will not be a "taking." Moreover, the state's taking may
present a federal issue sufficient to confer federal constitutional oversight.
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Hence, there will be nothing for which the government will be obligated to
compensate as a result of the navigation declaration.
Recreational navigation declarations in Arkansas are consistent with
the public domain type of assertion. As such, riparian landowners in Arkan-
sas will have few, if any, remedies for the state's declaration of a stream to
be navigable for recreational purposes. Other states considering a recrea-
tional navigation doctrine could similarly avoid takings claims by grounding
their doctrines as assertions in the public domain.
IV. CONCLUSION
The modem trend in Arkansas and in most states is to encourage a
finding of navigability if a stream or waterway can be used for recreational
purposes. It is likely that this trend will continue, and more litigants will
assert the recreational navigation doctrine in order that more streams and
waterbodies will be declared navigable by courts in Arkansas. Often, the
decision to declare a waterbody navigable is a discretionary one, making a
reversal on the merits unlikely. The firm support from appellate courts for
the doctrine indicates that the modern trend will likely continue.
In Arkansas, recreational navigation declarations are based on public-
domain types of assertions. These assertions limit the potential for litigation
based on the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution and the Ar-
kansas Constitution. However, in states where recreational navigation decla-
rations are premised on regulation, some remedies may be available to ripa-
rian owners in condemnation and inverse condemnation claims against the
government.
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